• 04/09 – Redefining EU Engagement with Conflict Society by Raffaele Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci (shurwp04-09)
• 03/09 – Human Rights in Conflicts: Securitizing or Desecuritizing? by Emily Pia and Thomas Diez (shurwp03-09)
• 02/09 – The Impact of Civil Society’s Human Rights Articulation on Securitization in Ethono-political Conflicts. A Qualitative Comparative Analysis by Thorsten Bonacker, Christian Braun, and Jana Groth (shurwp02-09)
• 01/09 – Media as Civil Society Actors in Israel and their Influence on the Israel-Palestine Conflict by Rabea Hass (shurwp01-09)
• 05/08 – The Role of Civil Society in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Case of the Associations of Victims and Relatives of Missing Persons in Bosnia & Herzegovina by Valentina Gentile (shurwp05-08)
• 04/08 – CASE STUDY REPORT Human Rights, Civil Society and Conflict in Israel/Palestine by Kenneth Brown, Laure Fourest, and Are Hovdenak (shurwp04-08) (hebrew trans. shurwp06-09bis)(arabic trans. shurwp07-09bis)
• 03/08 – CASE STUDY REPORT Human Rights, Civil Society and Conflict in Cyprus: Exploring the Relationship by Olga Demetriou and Ayla Gurel (shurwp03-08) (turkish trans. shurwp09-09bis) (greek trans. shurwp10-09bis)
• 02/08 – CASE STUDY REPORT Conflict Society and the Transformation of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Question by Giulio Marcon, Sergio Andreis, Thorsten Bonacker, Christian Braun, Francesca Nicora, Valentina Pellizzer, and Inger Skjelsbaer (shurwp02-08) (bosnian trans. shurwp05-09bis)
• 01/08 – CASE STUDY REPORT Conflict Society and the Transformation of the Turkey’s Kurdish Question by Nathalie Tocci & Alper Kaliber (shurwp01-08) (turkish trans. shurwp08-09bis)
• 06/07 – Comprehensive Understanding of Civil Society: The Condition of Equilibrium by Valentina Gentile (shurwp06-07)
• 05/07 – The Concept of Securitisation as a Tool for Analysing the Role of Human Rights-Related Civil Society in Ethno-Political Conflicts by Thorsten Gromes & Thorsten Bonacker (shurwp05-07)
• 04/07 – Conflict society and Human Rights:A Gender Analysis by Diana Copper (shurwp04-07)
• 03/07 - Conflict Society and Human Rights by Raffaele Marchetti & Nathalie Tocci (shurwp03-07)
• 02/07 - Conflict and Human Rights: A Gender Analysis by Diana Copper (shurwp02-07)
• 01/07 - Conflict and Human Rights: A Theorethical Framework by Emily Pia & Thomas Diez (shurwp01-07)

Policy Blueprint

• 01/09 – The Role of Civil Society in Ethno-Political Conflicts, the Politicization of Human Rights, and the EU Engagement by Raffaele Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci (shur pblueprint 01-09)

Policy briefs

• 01/09 – Human Rights and Civil Society in Gaza: A New Role for the EU by Are Hovdenak, Raffaele Marchetti, and Nathalie Tocci (shur-pb01-09)

Videos

• 01/09 – Sarajevo 12 years later, by Veronica Raccah and Multiverse (link to the video)

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Following the 1993 Oslo accords, the overall concept for a solution (although this was not codified by the international community until almost a decade later), was that the conflicting claims of the parties could be reconciled through a territorial compromise. Israel would satisfy its right for self-determination, while allowing for the satisfaction of Palestinian collective and individual rights by withdrawing from the territories it occupied in 1967. Yet the concept has not materialised yet, and its ineffective implementation triggered in 2000 the most violent stage of the conflict since 1948.

In the discussion on human rights and conflict, the Israel-Palestine study opens key issues and questions. First, and connected in particular to the Cyprus conflict, is the link between individual and collective rights in conflict. The case of Israel-Palestine is characterised by a seeming irreconcilability between the parties’ claims to rights. UN Resolution 242, the Oslo accords, and the ensuing development of the two-state solution concept were based on the premise that the parties’ collective rights could be mutually satisfied through a territorial arrangement. Israel would withdraw to the 1967 borders and exert its collective right to self-determination on the 1948 boundaries. The Palestinians would exert their right to self-determination through a state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The territorial solution also entailed the partial fulfilment of the parties’ individual human rights. Hence, Israelis would be guaranteed safety and security and Palestinians would no longer suffer the human rights abuses deriving from Israel’s occupation. Yet the territorial solution alone cannot account for all parties’ claims to rights. More specifically, Israel’s understanding of its collective right (of Jewish rather than Israeli self-determination) contrasted with the Palestinian refugees’ demanded right of return, as well as the rights to equal citizenship called for by the Palestinian minority in Israel.

This raises the fundamental question concerning the potential clash between collective and individual rights and more specifically regarding the definition of what a legitimate collective right entails. A related question concerns the nature of negotiations and a future settlement. In the light of a conflict between individual rights and the specific interpretation of collective rights, does a settlement and/or resolution require the mutual satisfaction of perceived rights? Is the respect for individual human rights a prerequisite for conflict resolution over and above settlement? Or does the attachment to law and rights hinder a compromise settlement in the Middle East?

As opposed to Turkey’s Kurdish question, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has seen a vibrant role of civil society. International NGOs have been present in the region, principally operating in Palestine, particularly since the 1993 Oslo process. This has been due to the humanitarian and human rights situation on the ground (which deteriorated considerably since 2000), as well as to the degree of international attention devoted to the conflict. There has been considerable international and European attention devoted to the Israel-Palestine conflict because of its potential negative spill-over effects (similarly to the Western Balkans and unlike Cyprus). This has also made European decision-makers potentially responsive to the lobbying activities of Jewish or Arab (and Muslim) lobbying groups operating within member states and at the EU level. Finally, the presence of international civil society actors has been high in view of the permeability of the Palestinian context. The absence of statehood in Palestine has generated a highly fluid and open situation in which the divide between the public sphere and the wider civil society arena has been far from clear-cut.

For similar reasons there has been a burgeoning civil society sector in both Israel and the Palestinian territories. In Palestine, the absence of a sovereign state, the continuing occupation and the high degree of donor assistance (when compared to other conflicts) has led to a mushrooming of NGOs in the occupied territories. In Israel, in view of the degree of democratic practice (albeit incomplete), both Israeli Jewish and Israeli Arab NGOs have operated on the ground. Their work has concentrated on issues pertaining to Israeli policies in the occupied territories (e.g., human rights NGOs opposing settlements, settler movements calling for Jewish rights to settle in the West Bank and Gaza, or ‘refusenick’ movements opposing Israel’s military conduct in the territories) as well as on policies and practices concerning the rights and status of the Palestinian minority in Israel. Far less common have been genuinely bi-communal NGO’s, due to the degree of tension between the parties as well as the objective difficulties in meeting and operating jointly on the ground.

The Israel-Palestine conflict opens a set of questions and dilemmas of key importance to this project. The first set of inter-connected questions, relating to Palestine, concern the role of civil society in a non-state context. In view of the absence of a sovereign state and the ensuing blurred lines between state and non-state actors, what have been the implications on the role and effectiveness of local (as well as international) civil society actors in the occupied territories? How have the aims, conceptions and modus operandi of international donors affected the nature, actions and effectiveness of Palestinian civil society? What has been the effect on civil society of donors’ concentration on the most ‘westernised’ Palestinian towns (Jerusalem and Ramallah) at the expense of smaller and more peripheral areas? What has been the role of civil society actors, principally the ones belonging to the broad Islamic camp in Palestine and Jewish fundamentalism in Israel and what has been their role and influence in the conflict?

The second set of questions concerns the impact of the conflict on civil society. As in the case of Cyprus, the physical difficulty of meeting and working together has led to the absence of bi-communal NGOs. In addition, the very lack of an agreement and the deep animosities between the two societies has hindered joint initiatives, or discredited domestically the few track-two initiatives that have existed (some of which have led to the signature of an unofficial agreements). In other words, what impact has the conflict itself had on the effectiveness of bi-communal civil society and how have joint Israeli-Palestinian initiatives sought to escape the vicious circle of mutual mistrust in which they have been caught in?

The lack of an entrenched civic culture, of a rooted civil society and of democracy, as well as the complexities inherent in a multi-ethnic federal state prepared the ground for ethnic-based civil wars. Ethnic/identity discrimination has been viewed as a powerful tool to create the image of an ‘enemy’, supporting nationalist strategies to retain the power and use the conflict to reinforce their leadership.

Ethnic cleansing has been one of the worst human rights violations during the conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina. As a result there have been approximately two million IDPs (internal displaced persons) and refugees on a population of almost four million. Ethnic cleansing has been the objective (rather than the consequence) of the conflict. Other systematic violations of human rights (harassment, rape, etc.) occurred during the consolidation of the conflict. During the war, the “urbicide” (against Sarajevo, Mostar, etc. besieged and shelled for a long time) took place as specific ways of attacking civilian populations and their multiethnic communities.

The Bosnia Herzegovina case study highlights how, in the pre-war stage, the violation of human rights or the perception of vulnerability of ethnic groups generated the conflict and its escalation. The case study will investigate how some faults of the state-building project in Bosnia (rule, procedures and guarantees for minorities and citizens in a multiethnic context; the balances within civil society and institutions) affected the weak protection of human rights and the outbreak of the war.

During the conflict, local and European civil actors emerged playing an important role in defending and promoting human rights. Both humanitarian organisations and citizens’ organisations organised the monitoring of human rights violations, defending multiethnic cities, developing common initiatives against the nationalists and the warlords. Specific good practices were developed by civil actors in the field: ‘diplomacy from below’, ‘bridging the communities’, ‘human shields’ and reconciliation initiatives. Many networks worked to create several linkages with citizens’ organisations from the opposite side, to build from below a peace process based on the role of civil actors. Generally, the role of humanitarian organisations have been remarkable. They have not been neutral to human rights violations and have activated themselves as a part of an international system for the protection of civilians. It will thus be crucial to investigate how track-two diplomacy worked in the Bosnian conflict; the weakness and strength of the approaches and initiatives.

The case study will also highlight the role of the civil actors during the different stages of conflict: the inability to prevent it, the support in building bridges between the communities during the war, the role in the post war stage, as a crucial peace building actor. As a specific part of the case study, it will be important to underline the perceptions that emerged amongst civil society organisations concerning the need for a strong system for the prevention of new conflicts and violent tensions during the consolidation and the end of the conflict.

After 1995 (Dayton Agreement) the war ended, a settlement was reached but the conflict remains to be ‘resolved’. It is thus crucial to examine how -after 1995- the peace process reinforced the capacity building functions of civil society related to the need to create an effective protection system in the human rights field. After 1995, civil society in Bosnia Herzegovina -also thanks to the support of the international community- developed organisations, networks, and lobbying activities. It is useful to highlight how these new organisations perceived the end of conflict, overcame the ‘enemy image’ and enduring tensions, elaborating good practices and specific techniques to entrench human rights and peace.

During the climax of the conflict, namely during the war between the separatist PKK and the Turkish armed forced (1984-1999), human rights abuses led to a vicious circle entrenching and deepening the conflict. On the one hand, the violations perpetrated by the Turkish state against its Kurdish citizens reinforced the Kurdish belief that their security, rights, identity and prosperity could not be guaranteed by the Turkish establishment. This mobilised support for the search for alternative solutions (including secession) as well as for violent means to achieve their ends. On the other hand, the human rights abuses perpetrated by Kurdish militants added to the securitisation of the Kurdish question in Turkey, vindicating the stance of the most nationalist factions and preventing the ensuing de-escalation of the conflict.

Yet, the military ‘victory’ of the Turkish armed forces culminating with the capture of the PKK leader Ocalan in 1999 and the concomitant initiation of Turkey’s EU accession course opened the way for the de-escalation of the conflict. This led both to the strengthening of human rights, the gradual extension of cultural rights and to the first steps towards a political and socio-economic normalisation in the region. However, an additional political factor recently emerged could impact on this state of affairs. The current Iraqi situation, where a strong Kurdish compoment is present, could influence the Kurdish situation also in Turkey.

The human rights dimension of this case study generates two sets of interlinked questions. First and as opposed to Cyprus, the formation of separate identities in the case of Turkey’s Kurds appears to have emerged together with the state’s violations of human rights. This in turn did not lead to the emergence of a conflict between two communities (i.e., Turks and Kurds). It rather triggered a conflict between one community (the Kurds) and the state; whose policies, based on a specific reading of the nationalist agenda, were perceived as excluding or being directed against it. What does the Kurdish question tell us about the complex relationship between the violation of rights, identity-formation and the emergence of conflict? Second, in its period of escalation, the Kurdish question appears to vindicate the hypothesis that violence contributed to the securitisation of the question, triggering a vicious circle of violence and counter-violence and the ensuing inflexibility of demanded solutions. In turn, it was only when violence subsumed that a new rights-based discourse came to the fore. This raises the controversial question of whether an end of violence, achieved through military victory and grave human rights abuses, could set a solid basis for genuine pacification of the conflict. Hence, what are the causal links between human rights abuses and the securitisation of conflicts and what were the necessary preconditions for the initiation of de-escalation in Turkey’s south-east?

The civil society dimension in Turkey’s Kurdish question offers important insights due to its subtle relationship with the human rights dimension. Individual human rights include the freedoms of expression and association, i.e., necessary conditions for a flourishing civil society. Yet not least due to the escalation of Turkey’s Kurdish question, these freedoms have been seriously curtailed in the country particularly since the 1980s, first and foremost in the Kurdish south-east. This has led to a relatively low presence of civil society actors operating on the Kurdish question. In fact, until the mid-1990s most civil society actors of any political complexion were regarded with suspicion in Turkey, so civil society culture was generally weak. In fact, until the mid-1990s most civil society actors of any political complexion were regarded with suspicion in Turkey so civil society culture was generally weak. Local Kurdish of Turkish groups have been frequently hindered, and international NGOs have frequently been denied the right to operate in the country. In addition, the hosting of Kurdish NGOs in (European) third countries exacerbated inter-governmental diplomatic tensions with the Turkish state. With the growing political liberalisation in the country, local civil society actors have become freer to act (this has been truer for Turkish rather than Kurdish associations) and international NGOs are now more present on the ground.

This raises two sets of key questions relevant to this project. The first concerns the inverse relationship between human rights and civil society. To what extent is the respect for human rights a necessary condition for an effective civil society? The second concerns the effects of curtailing rights and freedoms on the nature
of civil society. It may be argued that not least due to restricted political and civil space in Turkey’s south-east, civil society action has taken place largely outside the country, namely in third states which have hosted large Kurdish communities (who had in turn emigrated due to the poverty and violence in the region). Yet often, these groups have represented the most extreme voices in the conflict, acting as lobbying groups for the militant forces in battle in the country. What has been the effect of human rights violations on the nature of civil society and thus its potential contribution to (or hindering effect on) conflict resolution?

As the conflict entered into its negotiation stage, reaching a climax with the UN negotiated ‘Annan Plan’ in 2004, human rights became a principal item on the conflict settlement agenda, and a fundamental factor underlying the parties’ conflicting claims. The Greek Cypriot community has demanded the unconditional right of refugee return and the full liberalisation of the freedoms of movement, settlement and property acquisition throughout the island. The Turkish Cypriot community has rejected these claims based on the fear that their satisfaction would trigger a renewed domination and ensuing abuses of human rights against them.

In this respect, the Cyprus case study highlights two key questions of fundamental relevance to this project. The first, calling for a critical analysis of human rights in conflicts, concerns the manipulation of a human rights discourse to justify and legitimise inflexible positions in negotiations. Defending a bargaining position on the basis of human rights and demonstrating how such rights are enshrined in international law (and in the case of Cyprus now, the more binding and specific Community law) has been used frequently in Cyprus as an instrument to bolster spoiling positions in negotiations.

Second, the Cyprus case study raises the fundamental question of the very definition of human rights in terms of their relevance and causal relationship to conflicts. In ethno-political conflicts, do human rights include only individual rights or do they also comprise the right to self-determination, whose satisfaction could be accomplished minimally through minority rights or federal arrangements and maximally through recognised statehood? Are, and more importantly when are collective rights, including the right to self-determination, accepted into the broad definition of human rights in conflicts? Do they qualify only when they are constitutionally enshrined and consequently violated (as in the case of Cyprus in the 1960 agreements)? When does their previous violation call for a higher level of protection in future agreements (shifting a solution in Cyprus from a bi-communal one in 1960 to a territorial federal/confederal one since 1974)?

Moving to the civil society dimension, the Cyprus conflict has witnessed the primacy of local NGO activity both within Cyprus and in third countries, most notably countries hosting large Cypriot communities such as the UK. In other words, the conflict has seen a predominance of separate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot NGO activity, operating both on the island and abroad. The functions of these groups have been concentrated in the areas of information provision, lobbying as well as mobilisation (in the case of the Turkish Cypriots this has been more evident than for the Greek Cypriots, particularly since 2002). By contrast, bi-communal civil society actors as well as international NGOs have been far fewer. The absence of bi-communal groups has been largely due to the closure of the border up until 2003, as well as the constructed feeling of animosity present on the island. The absence of international NGOs may be largely explained by the lack (since 1974) of a visible and acute crisis on the island. While dynamics on the ground have been far from static, Cyprus, like other conflicts in the European neighbourhood, has been often referred to as a ‘frozen conflict’. This has entailed a minimal level of international attention, by both governmental and non-governmental actor alike.

What have been the effects of the predominant role of local NGOs on the conflict, in particular with respects to its human rights dimension? Has the predominance of community-based groups fostered reconciliation, or has it spurred segregation and bolstered the use of an inflexible human rights discourse? What has been the effect of NGO activity on the negotiating positions of the leaderships? What role did NGOs play in mobilising the wider public in favour of particular solutions? What has been the effectiveness of these groups on wider EU-decision-making, both in influencing EU institutions as well as (and perhaps primarily) by working through member states in which they were strongly represented?