PROGRAM

Sunday, September 25

10.00-10.15 Opening remarks
10.30-11.15 Nicolas Vieille (HEC)
Social learning in one-arm bandit problems
11.30-12.00 Coffee break
12.00-12.45 Matteo Marsili (Abdus Salam ICTP)
To herd or not to herd?
13.00-14.00 Lunch
15.00-15.45 Alfredo Di Tillio (Università Bocconi)
Subjective expected utility in games
15.45-16.15 Coffee break
16.15-17.00 Daijiro Okada (Rutgers University)
Strategic complexity, strategy set growth and nonstationary bounded recall
17.15-18.00 Olivier Gossner (PSE)
Ability and knowledge

Monday, September 26

9.30-10.15 Pierfrancesco La Mura (HHL)
Correlated equilibrium with quantum signals
10.30-11.30 BRUNO BASSAN LECTURE 1
Sylvain Sorin (Université Paris 6)
Stochastic approximation and dynamics in games
11.30-12.00 Coffee break
12.00-12.45 Amrita Dhillon (University of Warwick)
On the role of formal and informal institutions in development
13.00-14.00 Lunch
15.00-15.45 Jérôme Renault (Université Paris Dauphine)
Reliability and security of multicast communication in networks
15.45-16.15 Coffee break
16.15-17.00 Dinah Rosenberg (Université Paris 13)
Games with no observation

Tuesday, September 27

9.30-10.15 Eduardo Faingold (University of Pennsylvania)
Building a reputation under frequent decisions
10.30-11.30 Pierpaolo Battigalli (Università Bocconi)
Dynamic psychological games
11.30-12.00 Coffee break
12.00-12.45 Gilles Stoltz (École Normale Supérieure)
Regret minimization under partial monitoring
13.00-14.00 Lunch
15.00-15.45 Krzysztof Szajowski (Wroclaw University of Technology)
Correlated equilibria in Markov stopping games
15.45-16.15 Coffee break
16.15-17.00 Ludovic Renou (University of Adelaide)
More strategies, more Nash equilibria

Thursday, September 29

9.30-10.15 Penelope Hernandez (Universitat d'Alacant)
Schelling dinamic model: A cellular automata approach
10.30-11.30 Nabil Al-Najjar (Northwestern University)
On the theory of large games
11.30-12.00 Coffee break
12.00-12.45 Qingmin Liu (Stanford Unviersity)
Representation of beliefs in games with incomplete information
13.00-14.00 Lunch
15.00-15.45 Sergio Scarlatti (Università di Chieti)
Discounted and finitely repeated minority games
15.45-16.15 Coffee break
16.15-17.00 Tristan Tomala (Université Paris Dauphine)
Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

Friday, September 30

9.30-10.15 Marco Dall'Aglio (Università di Chieti)
Filling knapsacks with candies
10.30-11.30 BRUNO BASSAN LECTURE 2
Jean-François Mertens (CORE)
Comparison of information schemes
11.30-12.00 Coffee break
12.00-12.45 Fabrizio Germano (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing
13.00-14.00 Lunch
15.00-15.45 Jean-Jacques Herings (Maastricht University)
The communication complexity of private value single item auctions
15.45-16.15 Coffee break
16.15-17.00 Peter Vida (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)
A detail-free mediator

Saturday, October 1

9.30-10.15 Rida Laraki (École Polytechnique)
Continuity properties of general zero-sum stochastic games and applications
10.30-11.15 Frederic Koessler (Université de Cergy-Pontoise)
Long persuasion in sender-receiver games
11.30-12.00 Coffee break
12.00-12.45 Jihong Lee (Birkbeck College)
Efficiency in negotiation: complexity and costly bargaining
13.00-14.00 Lunch
15.00-15.45 Justo Puerto (Universidad de Sevilla )
Sampling theory and cooperative games
15.45-16.15 Coffee break
16.15-17.00 Jean-Christophe Vergnaud (Université Paris 1)
Information and belief revision