PUBLIC REGULATION AND ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE

The EU as a regulatory polity: fundamental constitutional and economic concepts The introductory week situates public regulation within the specific economic and constitutional structure of the EU. The class will address three interrelated regulatory questions: why, how, and who. We start by asking why to regulate at a supranational level at the first place. We investigate different rationales such as to remove obstacles to trade, correct market failures, ensure fair competition, manage cross-border externalities, protect consumers and workers, and provide European public goods such as financial stability, environmental protection and energy security. This part also addresses the issue of how EU law (re)structures the relationship between market integration and public intervention. This part of the lecture introduces the basic constitutional concepts that built the EU as a multi-level regulatory polity, focusing on competences, and the principles governing their exercise as well as the role of EU institutions in economic governance. This part reflects thus on the question of who regulates. R Schütze, An Introduction to European Union Law (5th ed., OUP 2026), ch. 3, 5, and 6 Further reading A Bradford, The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World (OUP 2020), Introduction and ch. 1. J. Zeitlin, B. Rangoni, (2025) “How the European Union reconciles uniform regulation with legitimate diversity: towards a tighter experimentalist governance architecture”, Journal of European Public Policy, 1–29. CASES: Case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos (1963) Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v ENEL (1964)

Introduction to the Single Market I (The Fundamental Freedoms; Goods and Services) The focus in the following two weeks is on “negative integration” and mutual recognition as instruments for building the EU Single Market. The first week covers the general aspects of the Single Market’s scope and legal foundations – the four fundamental freedoms. It then focuses on the specific Treaty rules and case law underpinning the free movement of goods and services, and how national barriers were removed by some fundamental judgments of the Court of Justice. In this context, we will also discuss how free movement interacts with social and regulatory policies. R Schütze, An Introduction to European Union Law (5th ed., OUP 2026), ch. 9 C Barnard and S Peers (eds), European Union Law (5th ed., OUP 2026), ch. 14 Further readings L W Gromley, “Free Movement of Goods and Their Use – What is the use of it?”, Fordham International Law Journal, 33(6) 2011, 1589-1627 CASES Case 8/74, Dassonville (1974) Case C-120/78, Cassis de Dijon (1979) Case 33/74, Van Bindsbergen (1974)

Introduction to the Single Market II (Persons and Capital) This week we will turn to the free movement of persons and capital. The lecture examines how EU law facilitates mobility for workers, self-employed persons, companies, service providers and economically inactive citizens. Reference will also be made to the development of EU citizenship as fundamental civic status. The course then introduces the free movement of capital, including its distinctive external dimension and its relevance for financial integration, investment and ownership restrictions. We will also discuss the continuing efforts to build a savings and investments union (SIU). The session highlights the constitutional importance of these freedoms: they expand market access and individual mobility, but also constrain national choices in fields such as taxation, welfare, public services, corporate regulation and financial control. R Schütze, An Introduction to European Union Law (5th ed., OUP 2026), ch. 10 C Barnard and S Peers (eds), European Union Law (5th ed., OUP 2026), ch. 15 Further reading Case C-10/10, Commission v Austria (2011) Case C-181/23 Commission v Malta (2025)

Introduction to the Single Market III (Positive Integration and Harmonisation) This week we will examine how the Single Market is being established not only by removing national barriers to trade, but also by adopting common EU rules. We introduce the concept of positive integration, with particular emphasis on harmonisation under Article 114 TFEU. We will discuss why divergent national standards can fragment markets, and how EU legislation creates common conditions for market access while also developing a Union public interest in areas such as consumer protection, health, safety, and environmental protection. The session also considers the constitutional limits of harmonisation and the role of the Court in policing the boundary between market-making and general regulatory power. R Schütze, European Law (OUP 2025), ch. 14 C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms, 8th edn (Oxford University Press, 2025, ch 14) Further reading Case C-376/98, Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising I) (2000) Case C-58/08, Vodafone (2010)

Regulating Competition I This week examines the general legal framework of competition law in Europe, from the perspective of constitutional and public law. Students will be introduced to the foundations of competition law, a field which lies at the very heart of European integration and offers an important lens through which to understand the broader structure of European regulation. The first part examines the rationale behind competition policy, including the public/general interest reasons underlying competition rules, as well as their historical development in the European context. Competition law will be compared with other EU regulatory policies in order to understand the relationships, tensions, and dynamics between them. The introductory framework includes the analysis of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. G Amato, Antitrust and the Bounds of Power: The Dilemma of Liberal Democracy in the History of the Market (Hart 1997), Introduction, pp. 1–6 E Deutscher, Competition Law and Democracy (CUP 2024), Introduction R Schütze, An Introduction to European Union Law (5th ed., OUP 2026), ch. 11 Further readings David J. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (OUP 1998 ch 7-8 M C Iacovides and K Stylianou, “The new goals of EU competition law: sustainability, labour rights, and privacy” European Law Open (2025) CASES Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands Case C-85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche

Regulating Competition II Following up from the previous week, this part examines the rules on state aid. Grounded in Articles 107-109 TFEU, the study of the rules on state aid adopts a transdisciplinary perspective, taking into consideration the most recent contributions as well as policy reports, such as that authored by Draghi. Recent geopolitical pressures have reignited debate about the regime's compatibility with, and possible contribution to, an active EU industrial policy. European Parliamentary Research Service, “State Aid in the EU: State of Play” (2026), K Bacon, Introduction to State Aid Law and Policy, in K. Bacon, European Union Law of State Aid, 3rd Edition (2017; online edn, Oxford Law Pro) P Ibáñez Colomo, The New Law of State Aid and Subsidies (Hart Publishing, 2026), Introduction and chs 1 and 6

Recent Developments in EU Competition Law Building on the general framework covered in the previous weeks, this session examines the most recent developments in EU competition law and policy. Particular attention will be devoted to the enforcement of the Digital Markets Act. H Schmidt, 'Goldilocks and the three laws – Competition law, the Digital Markets Act, and the Digital Service Act: Regulation of online safety', (2025), 62, Common Market Law Review, Issue 5, pp. 1373-1406 P van Cleynenbreugel (Ch. 2.), Digital Technology Disruptions and Competition Law Enforcement: A Stress Test for the Existing Governance and Enforcement Frameworks?, in C M Colombo, M Eliantonio, K Wright, The Evolving Governance of EU Competition Law in a Time of Disruptions. A Constitutional Perspective Further readings M Botta, The Digital Markets Act: two years after, where do we stand? Some reflections on DMA achievements and future challenges, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Volume 14, Issue 2, July 2026, Pages 386–393

PART I: Banking regulation I This week we will introduce the basic legal architecture of EU banking regulation and supervision. We will discuss the Banking Union as a major regulatory project and the Single Supervisory Mechanism as an innovative regulatory mechanism. The lecture will explain how prudential regulation seeks to protect financial stability, depositors and the integrity of the banking system at a Union level. Special emphasis is placed on the distinctive administrative structure of the SSM, in which the ECB and national competent authorities cooperate within a composite supervisory system. The session also examines the atypical regulatory interplay between Union and national law in this field, namely the ECB’s role in applying certain provisions of national law and the constitutional questions this raises for accountability, judicial review and the division of administrative authority. Alberto de Gregorio Merino, ‘The Banking Union in EU Law: An EU Institutional Law Perspective’, in Gianni Lo Schiavo (ed), The European Banking Union and the Role of Law (Edward Elgar 2019) Christoph Ohler, ‘Banking Supervision’ in Fabian Amtenbrink, Christoph Herrmann and René Repasi (eds), The EU Law of Economic and Monetary Union (Oxford University Press 2020) ch 37 Further readings Gianni Lo Schiavo, EU Banking Law and Regulation (OUP, 2024), Introduction and chs 3 and 5 Joined Cases C-777/22 P and C-789/22 P, ECB and Commission v Corneli (2025) Case C-450/17 P, Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg – Förderbank v ECB (“L-Bank”) (2019) PART II (30.10.2026, 8.30-10.00) MIDTERM TEST

Banking Regulation II This week we will examine how EU law allocates regulatory authority over money and payments, taking the digital euro and the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation. Seraina Grünewald, Corinne Zellweger-Gutknecht, Benjamin Geva, ‘Digital euro and ECB powers’, (2021), 58, Common Market Law Review, Issue 4, pp. 1029-1056 Dirk A Zetzsche, Filippo Annunziata, Douglas W Arner, Ross P Buckley, The Markets in Crypto-Assets regulation (MiCA) and the EU digital finance strategy, Capital Markets Law Journal, Volume 16, Issue 2, April 2021, Pages 203–225

Macroeconomic governance I The week examines the evolution of the EU's (macro)economic governance tools. We will discuss the historical path of macroeconomic governance, from the early ambitions of the 1970 Werner Report and the 1979 European Monetary System to the decisive turning point of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. We will cover the Stability and Growth Pact and post-Euro crisis reforms (Six-Pack, Two-Pack, European Semester). Particular attention will be devoted to the coordination of fiscal policies among member states and budgetary surveillance. We will also explore non-fiscal regulation as well as the related tensions between economic integration and national sovereignty, critically assessing the effectiveness and democratic legitimacy of the current governance architecture. The approach will also be interdisciplinary, examining the historical and political reasons underlying the construction of the concept of macroeconomic governance. Catherine Barnard and Steve Peers (eds), European Union Law (5th ed., OUP Oxford University Press 2026), ch. 19 Jean-Paul Keppenne, ‘Economic Policy Coordination: Foundations, Structures, and Objectives’/ ‘EU Fiscal Governance of the Member States: The Stability and Growth Pact and Beyond’/ ‘Non-Fiscal Surveillance of the Member States’ in Fabian Amtenbrink, Christoph Herrmann and René Repasi (eds), The EU Law of Economic and Monetary Union (Oxford University Press 2020) ch 27-29 Further reading Fabian Amtenbrink and J. de Haan, Economic Governance in the European Union - Fiscal Policy discipline versus flexibility, Common Market Law Review, 40, 2003, p. 1075 (optional) Paul Craig, The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics and Pragmatism, European Law Review, 2012, pp. 231-248. C. Joerges, Europe’s Economic Constitution in Crisis and the Emergence of a New Constitutional Constellation. German Law Journal. 2014;15(5):985-1027. Report to the Council and the Commission on the realisation by stages of economic and monetary Union, Werner Plan: https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication6142_en.pdf Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of 12 October 1993, official English translation: https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/1993/10/rs19931012_2bvr213492en.html

Macroeconomic governance II In the second session of this part, we will discuss the latest developments of EU (macro)economic governance. In response to the Covid crisis, the EU built an increasingly dense architecture of economic governance. This session will focus on the milestones of the Next Generation EU and the conditionality and their impact on the institutional architecture of EU economic regulation. The first part of the session reconstructs the legal architecture of NGEU: the EU Recovery Tool and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (Regulation (EU) 2021/241). Particular attention will be paid to the new method of government that NGEU introduces: conditionality operates alongside legislation as a tool of the EU. We will discuss the consequences for the EU’s constitutional process and for the design of regulation. We will ask whether this structure amounts to a temporary emergency response or rather (and convincingly) to a structural transformation of the EU’s “fiscal constitution”. The second part turns into the tool of conditionality. We will distinguish thematic conditions implementing EU policy goals, macroeconomic conditions operating as leverage for reforms, and rule of law conditionality Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092), as well as the distinction between ex ante and ex post conditionality mechanisms. Alicia Hinarejos, The Euro Area Crisis and Constitutional Limits to Fiscal Integration, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies. 2012; 14, pp. 243-268. Michael Ioannidis, Europe’s new transformations: How the EU economic constitution changed during the Eurozone crisis, in Common Market Law Review, Issue 5, pp. 1237-1282. Cristina Fasone, Nicola Lupo, “Learning from the euro crisis: A new method of government for the European Union’s economic policy coordination after the pandemic” International Journal of Constitutional Law (2024), 882–904. CASE: Case C370/12, Pringle

Legal instruments of Economic Regulation Final class with presentations and discussions in groups of students Group 1: Directives and Regulations Group 2: CJEU Judgments Group 3: RRF Spending and Conditonality in general Group 4: Agencies and soft law