GAMES AND STRATEGIES
Obiettivi formativi
The course will make the students familiar with interactive decision theory. Students will be able to analyze and solve simple problems in the fields of economics, management, and finance, using the techniques of game theory.
Risultati di apprendimento attesi
Linear algebra; univariate and multivariate calculus; elementary probability theory.
Contenuti Del Corso
Fundamentals of non-cooperative and cooperative game theory.
Testi Di Riferimento
Textbooks
-Anna R. Karlin and Yuval Peres (2016). Game Theory Alive, American Mathematical Society.
-Slides provided by the teachers.
-Exercises provided by the teachers and tutors
Other useful readings
- Michael Maschler, Eilon Solan, and Shmuel Zamir, Game Theory, Cambridge University Press (2013).
- Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press (2003).
- Levent Kockesen and Efe A. Ok, An Introduction to Game Theory (2007).
- Joel Watson, Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory, 3rd Edition, W. W. Norton & Company (2013).
- Ein-Ya Gura and Michael Maschler, Insights into Game Theory, Cambridge University Press (2008).
- Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, Vijay V. Vazirani, Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press (2007).
Metodologie Didattiche
Interactive learning. During classes students will be asked to offer solutions to problems proposed by the teacher.
Modalità di verifica dell'apprendimento
The exam consists in a written part with several exercises where the student, by solving some exercises, must demonstrate understanding of the main topics of the course. The student will be able to suitably model economic and managerial situations in terms of games and to find the corresponding solutions. For the purposes of assigning a mark out of thirty, the following evaluation criteria will be taken into account: Ability to model real-life problems with games; Capability to find the suitable solutions of the proposed games. There will be a possibility to obtain bonus points during the semester. During the whole course, 4 tests will be proposed, to solve in presence on personal device. Each test will be graded over 10 and the date of the tests will not be announced in advance. At the end of the semester, the teacher will compute the sum of the best three tests. The students will have the following bonuses depending on the result - sum from 18 (included) to 23 (included): 1 point - sum from 23 (excluded) to 27 (included): 2 points - sum from 27 (excluded) to 30 (included): 3 points The bonus points are only valid for an exam grade obtained at the first or the second session. They will not be taken into account for other sessions. The final mark for the course is determined by the sum of the grades obtained in the various exercises in the exam, whose maximum grade is known to the students, plus the bonus, if obtained, according to the previous rules. The teacher reserves the right to have an oral examination if the written exam leaves some doubts.
Criteri per l’assegnazione dell’elaborato finale
Solid understanding of the material, verified through a conversation with the teacher.
Settimana 1
Matching problems
-One-to-one and many-to-one matchings
-Stable matchings
Settimana 2
Matching problems
-Algorithms for matching
-Partial order on matchings
Settimana 3
Cooperative games
-Transferable utilities and coalitions
-Examples
-Solutions of cooperative games
-Imputation and core
-The core in simple games.
Settimana 4
The Shapley value
-Simple games and other semivalues
Settimana 5
Social choice
-The May theorem
-The Arrow theorem
-The Gibbard Satterwhite theorem
-Restricted domains
Settimana 6
Mechanism Design
-The VCG mechanism
Settimana 7
Introduction to non-cooperative games
-Games in strategic form
-Solution concepts: elimination of dominated strategies, Nash equilibrium
- Examples finite games: prisoner's dilemma, tragedy of the commons, battle of the sexes, doves and hawks...
Settimana 8
Mixed strategies and Continuous game
- Mixed extension of a finite game
- The Nash theorem of existence of equilibria for strategic games
-Examples: Finite game and Continuous Game (Cournot Competition, Hotelling)
Settimana 9
Extensive form games -Game trees -Solution by backward induction -Subgame perfection - Examples: Stackelberg competition
Settimana 10
Zero sum games -Examples -Conservative values - Maxmin/minmax strategies - Examples : Nim games
Settimana 11
Potential games
-The notion of potential and how to find it
-Local maxima and equilibria in pure strategies
-Convergence of Best Response Dynamics
-Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability
Settimana 12
Evolutionary and Correlated equilibria
- Evolutionary Stable Strategy
- Correlated equilibrium and Mediator
- Examples