Obiettivi formativi
The goal of the course is to expose the students to the basic concepts of strategic interactions, with a particular attention to situations that involve networks. The course will be mathematically formalized and rigorous.
Prerequisiti
Calculus, Multivariate Calculus, Linear Algebra, Elementary Probability
Risultati di apprendimento attesi
At the end of this course the student will understand some fundamental concepts of game theory and network theory, and will be able to
1. formally model some real-life situations in terms of games and on networks,
2. find the suitable solution concepts,
3. draw conclusions from the above modeling.
Contenuti Del Corso
The course will cover the basic aspects of non-cooperative game theory, i.e., games in normal form, mixed strategies, and main solution concepts (iterated elimination of dominated strategies, Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium), games in extensive form, behavior strategies, and main solution concepts (subgame perfect equilibrium), games with incomplete information. It will then move to network theory, starting with a survey of the basic concepts in graph theory and then moving to network formation (stochastic and strategic).
Testi Di Riferimento
Jackson, M.O. (2008)
Social and Economic Networks. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Maschler, M., Solan, E., Zamir, S. (2020) Game Theory.
Second edition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Pass, R. (2018) A Course in Networks and Markets: Game-Theoretic Models and Reasoning. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Metodologie Didattiche
The whole course will be taught in an interactive way.
Modalità di verifica dell'apprendimento
Daily quizzes, a project, participation, a final exam.
Criteri per l’assegnazione dell’elaborato finale
An interview with the student
Settimana 1
Strategic-form games
MSZ Ch 4
Settimana 2
Mixed strategies
MSZ Ch 5
Settimana 3
Extensive-form games
MSZ Ch 3
Settimana 4
Behavior strategies and Kuhn’s Theorem
MSZ Ch 6
Settimana 5
Equilibrium refinements
NSZ Ch 7
Settimana 6
Correlated equilibria
NSZ Ch 8
Settimana 7
Games with incomplete information and common priors
NSZ Ch 9
Settimana 8
Auctions
MSZ Ch 12
Settimana 9
Repeated games
MSZ Ch 13
Settimana 10
Stable matching
MSZ Ch 22
Settimana 11
Random Graph-Based Models of Networks
Jackson Ch 4
Settimana 12
Strategic Network Formation
Jackson Ch 6