Instructional goals
The course primarily aims at providing students with an adequate understanding of the legal and economic principles of national and EU competition law, equipping them with the tools necessary to carry out a sound assessment of firms’ conduct from an antitrust law perspective.
A core objective of the course, pursued through the casebased analysis of national and EU proceedings concerning cartels, abuses of dominance and mergers, is also to foster students’ ability to identify and critically address the main legal and economic issues underlying the application of national and EU antitrust law.
Prerequisites
Intended learning outcomes
Independent judgement
Students are expected to be able to independently formulate wellreasoned observations with regard to practical cases, legislative texts, administrative decisions and, more generally, matters relating to antitrust law. This is to be achieved through research and collection of relevant information relating to the practical cases submitted, mainly functional to the development of debates in which students can present their own personal observations.
Communication skills
Students are expected to be able to engage effectively in discussions relating to antitrust law, both during the final oral examination and through classroom debates, making appropriate use of the technical terminology required by the matter.
Learning skills
Students are expected to have developed adequate learning skills enabling them to approach the study required both for the analysis of practical cases presented during the course and for the final oral examination in a selfdirected and autonomous manner.
Course Contents
Basic economic notions
Article 101(1) and 101(3) TFEU
Theory of harm: collusion
Horizontal agreements
Theory of harm: softening competition/unilateral effects
Vertical agreements
Article 102 TFEU
Abuse of dominance
Theory of harm: foreclosure
Mergers
Relevant market and unilateral effects in mergers
Cases
Reference Books
R. Whish, D. Bailey, Competition Law, Oxford University Press, 2024
M. Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press, 2015
Materials / papers / presentations / mock questions / resumes of the practical cases to be analyzed and discussed during the course sessions
Teaching Methods
Lectures / analysis of practical cases / interactive discussions / individual exercises / collaborative works / assignments / guest lectures.
Assessment Method
The assessment procedure is based on a grading scale out of thirty points and consists of two distinct components:
(i) discussion of the practical cases addressed during the lectures, in which each student is required to participate and which is worth a maximum of 10 points per student;
(ii) a final written exam, worth an overall maximum of 20 points per student.
The written exam is a closedbook exam and is structured as follows:
(i) one scenariobased question, aimed at testing the ability to address and structure the solution to a hypothetical case (for example, by identifying a possible line of defense in an antitrust investigation) - this component is worth an overall maximum of 10 points;
(ii) one section with ten multiplechoice questions, aimed at assessing the general understanding of competition policy from both a legal and an economic perspective - this component is worth an overall maximum of 10 points.
The final grade will be calculated as the sum of the scores obtained in the assessment components mentioned above.
Thesis assignment criteria
Effective attendance of the course, examination grade, overall grade average and personal motivation.
Week 1
Lesson 1 – Basic economic notions
The notion of market power
Relationship between market power and efficiency
MP and allocative efficiency
MP and productive efficiency
MP and dynamic efficiency
The “modern” approach: theories of harm
Counterfactual (a “legal” requirement)
Firms’ ability
Firms’ incentives
Theories of harm (introduction)
Softening competition/Unilateral effects
Collusion/Coordinated effects
Foreclosure
Efficiency justifications
Proving a theory of harm (or an efficiency justification): the role of economic analysis
Lesson 2 – Introduction; Article 101(1) and 101(3) TFEU
Introduction
Relationship between EU competition law and national competition laws
Article 101(1)
Undertakings and associations of undertakings
Agreements, decisions and concerted practices
Object or effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition
The de minimis doctrine
The effect on trade between Member States
Refusal to deal and margin squeeze
Article 101(3)
Criteria
Regulation 1/2003
Block exemptions
Week 2
Lesson 3 - Theory of harm: collusion
Prisoners’ dilemma
Repeated games
The folk theorem
Factors that facilitate collusion
Number of rivals
Concentration
Frequency of interaction
Transparency
Product homogeneity
Firms’ symmetry (market shares, costs)
Multi-market contact
Cartels
The use of circumstantial evidence
Application of the Bayes theorem to the assessment of circumstantial evidence
Plus and super-plus factors
Lesson 4 – Horizontal agreements
Cartels
European Commission’s approach to cartels
Horizontal price fixing
Horizontal market sharing
Quotas and other restrictions on production
Collusive tendering
Agreements relating to Terms and Conditions
Exchange of information
Advertising restrictions
Anti-competitive horizontal restraints
Oligopoly, tacit collusion and collective dominance
The theory of oligopolistic interdependence
Article 101
Article 102 and collective dominance
Cooperation agreements
Week 3
Lesson 5 – Cases
Cartels – Trucks, Wood Pulp
Lesson 6 - Theory of harm: softening competition/unilateral effects
Determinants of unilateral incentives to exercise market power
Number of rivals and concentration
Cournot model
Measures of concentration
The HHI (thresholds)
Other determinants of market power
Product differentiation
Capacity constraints
Switching costs
Search costs
Degree of rivalry
The role of diversion ratios and closeness of competition
Week 4
Lesson 7 – Vertical agreements
The distribution chain
Vertical integration
Commercial agents
Vertical agreements: competition policy considerations
Vertical agreements: Article 101(1), Regulation 720/2022, application of Article 101(3) to agreements that do not satisfy the Block Exemption
Lesson 8 – Cases
Vertical restraints
Pierre Fabre,
Coty
Morellato
Week 5
Lesson 9 – Cases
RPM
Super Bock Bebidas (ref. to Gucci, Chloé e Loewe cases)
Lesson 10 – Article 102 TFEU
The Commission’s Guidance on Article 102 enforcement priorities
Undertakings
The effect on inter-State trade
Dominant position
A substantial part of the internal market
Small firms and narrow markets
Abuse
Defences
Consequences of infringing Article 102
Week 6
Lesson 11 – Abuse of dominance
Non-pricing practices
Exclusive dealing agreements
Tying
Refusal to supply
Non-pricing abuses that are harmful to the internal market
Miscellaneous other non-pricing abuses
Pricing practices
Exploitative pricing practices
Rebates that have effects similar to exclusive dealing agreements
Bundling
Predatory pricing
Margins squeeze
Price discrimination
Lesson 12 - Theory of harm: foreclosure
Predatory pricing and discount
The deep pocket theory
Chicago’s critiques
Predation with perfect information (sub-game perfection)
The chain store paradox
Predation with imperfect information
Reputation
Signaling
Week 7
Lesson 13 – Cases
Predatory pricing:
Qualcomm
Lesson 14 – Cases
Conditional rebates:
Intel
Week 8
Lesson 15 - Theory of harm: foreclosure
Refusal to deal and margin squeeze
Tying and bundling
Lesson 16 – Cases
Self-preferencing
Google Shopping
Week 9
Lesson 17 – Cases
Tying
Windows Media Player
Google Android
Lesson 18 – Cases
Superleague
Week 10
Lesson 19 – Mergers
Introduction – merger activity and purpose of a merger control
Overview of EU merger control
Jurisdiction
Notification, suspension of concentrations, procedural timetable and powers of decision
Substantive analysis
Remedies
Powers of investigation and enforcement
Judicial review
Internal cooperation
The EUMR in practice
Killer acquisitions and below-threshold mergers
Lesson 20 – Relevant market and unilateral effects in mergers
The notion of relevant market
Unilateral effects in merger control
The UPP test(s)
The GUPPI index
Week 11
Lesson 21 – Cases
Unilateral effects
Booking/eTraveli
Lesson 22 – Cases
Coordinated effects
Hutchison 3G Italy/WIND/JV
Week 12
Lesson 23 – Case
Foreclosure
EssilorLuxottica / GrandVision
Lesson 24 – Cases
Killer acquisition and below threshold mergers