MANAGING GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS

MANAGING GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS

Domenico Lombardi

Instructional goals

This graduate course offers an interdisciplinary exploration of the theory and practice of global institutions, blending international relations, economics, and political economy. The course emphasizes cumulative learning: theoretical insights and historical episodes in the early weeks will serve as reference points for understanding contemporary debates and institutional innovations in later sessions. Students will be assessed through a combination of policy-simulation memos, in-class presentations and active engagement, and a final exam. The course is reading-intensive and interactive, designed to foster analytical depth, conceptual clarity, and policy-relevant thinking.

Intended learning outcomes

Through engagement with case studies, students will explore how global governance is increasingly fragmented and contested. They will also develop the ability to formulate and defend evidence-based arguments regarding the reform potential and limitations of international institutions, drawing on both empirical case studies and normative considerations. In addition to enhancing their theoretical and empirical knowledge, students will strengthen their communication skills through structured class discussions, oral presentations, and written assignments. Emphasis will be placed on articulating complex ideas clearly and precisely, as well as engaging critically with policy debates surrounding institutional change and global cooperation.

Course Contents

Students examine the formation, evolution, and reform of major multilateral organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, WTO, G7, G20, and FSB, as well as select EU institutions and informal actors like BRICS. By combining theoretical frameworks with historical and contemporary case studies, the course investigates how these institutions address cross-border challenges in finance, trade, and development, while analyzing how power dynamics, institutional design, and reform debates shape their effectiveness. Delivered in an interactive format, the course emphasizes active, discussion-based learning and builds cumulatively from foundational concepts, highlighting the interplay between global and regional institutions, state and non-state actors, and North-South relations.

Reference Books

This is graduate course whose reading list consists mainly of Journal's articles, as detailed below.

Teaching Methods

The course consists of two classes per week, combining short lectures with in-depth, student-led discussions of assigned readings. Each week focuses on a specific theme or institution central to the evolution of international governance, beginning with theoretical foundations and progressing through historical case studies, major multilateral organizations, regional institutions, informal governance mechanisms, and emerging actors. Students are expected to complete all readings before class and actively participate in critical discussions.

Assessment Method

Attending student performance will be assessed through a combination of individual and collaborative assignments designed to foster analytical depth, written clarity, and active engagement. Specifically, grades will be based on the following components: Presentation: 15%. Each student will participate in a small-group presentation with no more than three peers in total, focusing on a week’s theme and readings. Presentations should provide a structured synthesis of the materials, raise discussion points, and encourage critical dialogue among peers. Specifically, students are expected to: identify and explain the central arguments and findings from the core readings; place those readings within the broader theoretical and policy debates discussed in class; critically engage with the material by highlighting tensions, gaps, or contrasting perspectives among the authors; develop 2–3 discussion questions aimed at provoking critical dialogue among peers, fostering comparative thinking, normative reflection, or application to current events; and finally, propose a short “what if” or “future trend” scenario, when suitable, to stimulate debate about the future relevance or evolution of the institution or governance challenge under review. Presentations should last approximately 15–20 minutes and be delivered with professional standards, including clear visual aids (PPT slides). Crisis Memo: 18%. Students are asked to step into the role of a senior-ranking official (e.g., at the IMF, G20 Secretariat, World Bank, ECB, or national Ministry of Finance) responding to a hypothetical yet plausible economic, financial, or global governance crisis by advising leadership on how to react. The memo must succinctly analyze the situation, identify key risks and stakeholders, present policy options with their associated trade-offs, and recommend a course of action based on the institutional context, theory, and case studies discussed in class. It will consist of no more than 1,500 words and will follow a template that will be presented. Based on the best-practice template, the memo will be assessed on clarity, analytical depth, relevance, and the actionability of recommendations. Students are encouraged to meet with the instructor in advance to discuss their approach and ensure alignment with course expectations. Final exam: 67%. The final exam will consist of questions designed to assess students’ ability to synthesize theoretical frameworks, critically evaluate the role and effectiveness of global institutions, and apply course concepts to contemporary governance challenges. Questions will draw from both required readings and in-class discussions, and emphasize analytical reasoning, structured argumentation, and clarity of expression. Students will be assessed on their ability to demonstrate cumulative learning, critical thinking, and clarity of written expression. They are required to engage thoroughly with the required readings and organize their arguments systematically. Review sessions will be held toward the end of the semester to help students prepare effectively for the final exam. Non-attending students’ performance will be assessed through a final exam that will account for 100% of the final grade. The test for non-attending students will be based on the required readings as well as the items marked with (*) in the Suggested Reading sections in the Syllabus.

Thesis assignment criteria

Demonstrated interest in the literature and a very good performance throughout the course.

Week 1

Week 1: Do We Need Global Institutions? Objectives • Understand foundational theories of institutions and development • Evaluate the need for supranational governance frameworks • Explore how global crises challenge institutional effectiveness Discussion Questions • What are the core functions of global institutions? • How does institutional theory explain development outcomes? • What limitations did the 2007-09 global financial crisis expose in existing governance structures? Required Readings Portes, Alejandro. “Institutions and Development: A Conceptual Reanalysis”, Population and Development Review, vol. 36, n. 2, pp. 13–36. Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2006.00117.x. Lopez-Claros, Augusto; Dahl, Arthur L.; Groff, Maja. “Background”, Global Governance and the Emergence of Global Institutions for the 21st Century, pp. 1–78. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/global-governance-and-the-emergence-of-global-institutions-for-the-21st-century/background/FDF1E60706E1A866B63BF095A7EBA136. Boughton, James; Lombardi, Domenico; Malkin, Anton. “The Limits of Global Economic Governance after the 2007–09 International Financial Crisis”, Global Policy, vol. 8, pp. 30–41. Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley, 2017. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12430. Suggested Readings Lopez-Claros, Augusto; Dahl, Arthur L.; Groff, Maja. “Foundations for a New Global Governance System”, Global Governance and the Emergence of Global Institutions for the 21st Century, pp. 431–470. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/global-governance-and-the-emergence-of-global-institutions-for-the-21st-century/foundations-for-a-new-global-governance-system/0402126CFEEF426FCF1FE6982376CBF8. Riaz, Suhaib. “The global financial crisis: an institutional theory analysis”, Critical Perspectives on International Business, Vol. 5 No. 1/2, pp. 26–35. Leeds, UK: Emerald, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1108/17422040910938668. (*)Platteau, Jean-Philippe. “The Economics of Institutional Change: Achievements and Challenges”, Handbook of New Institutional Economics, pp. 701–727. Springer Nature, 2025. https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-031-50810-3_28?utm_source=getftr&utm_medium=getftr&utm_campaign=getftr_pilot&getft_integrator=wiley. Sabiiti, Olive. “New Institutional Economics”, The Cambridge Handbook of Comparative Law, pp. 133–156, Cap 8 from Part 1. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2024. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-handbook-of-comparative-law/new-institutional-economics/1403ED14F51A5B13010475A5D4CA5237. Tamilina, Larysa.; Tamilina, Natalya. “Path-Break Versus Path-Drift: A Comparative Approach to Explain Variations in Institutional Effects on Economic Growth”, The American Economist, vol. 66, n. 2, pp. 281–300. Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: SAGE Publications, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0569434520956588. Helleiner, Eric. “The Status Quo Crisis: Global Financial Governance After the 2008 Meltdown”. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014. https://ideas.repec.org/b/oxp/obooks/9780199973637.html.

Week 2

Week 2: League of Nations and precursors to the current international order Objectives • Analyze the League of Nations as an early attempt at multilateralism • Assess its institutional strengths and political weaknesses • Trace precedents to the UN and Bretton Woods system Discussion Questions: • What were the League’s major institutional innovations? • Why did it ultimately fail to prevent war? • How do modern IOs reflect its legacy? Required Readings Hirschmann, Gisela. “Cambridge Review of International Affairs”, Crisis Management in International Organisations: The League of Nations’ Response to Early Challenges, vol. 37, n. 5, pp. 1–19. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2023. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09557571.2023.2271984. Pedersen, Susan. “Back to the League of Nations”, The American Historical Review, vol. 112, n. 4, pp. 1091–1117. Oxford, UK: Oxford Academic, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr.112.4.1091. Niemeyer, Gerhart. “International Organization”, The Balance Sheet of the League Experiment, vol. 6, n. 4, pp. 537–558. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1952. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2704792. Suggested Readings (*)Angenendt, Arnold (1983). “The institutions of the League of Nations”, The League of Nations in retrospect / La Société des Nations: retrospective, pp. 19–30. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110905854.19. Müller, Thomas. “Institutional Reforms and the Politics of Inequality Reproduction: The Case of the League of Nations’ Council Crisis in 1926”, Global Society, vol. 34, n. 3, pp. 304–317. Abingdon, UK: Taylor & Francis: 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2020.1739629. (*)Rofe, Simon J. “Prelude to the Future”: The Antecedents of the Bretton Woods Architecture.” In: Global Perspectives on the Bretton Woods Conference and the Post-War World Order. The World of the Roosevelts, edited by Scott-Smith, Giles; Rofe, Simon J. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2017 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60891-4_3.

Week 3

Week 3: The Bretton Woods Conference and its resulting architecture Objectives • Understand the historical context and design of the Bretton Woods system • Evaluate the strengths and limits of its architecture • Trace its transformation post-1971 Discussion Questions • What global conditions led to the Bretton Woods Agreement? • How did the institutions evolve after the gold standard? • What alternative models of governance are emerging today? Required Readings de Vries, Margaret Garristen. “The Bretton Woods Conference and the birth of the International Monetary Fund”, The Bretton Woods-GATT System, pp. 1–16. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 1996. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315700212-2/bretton-woods-conference-birth-international-monetary-fund-margaret-garritsen-de-vries. Elson, Anthony. “The Breakdown of the Bretton Woods System and First Reform of the International Financial Architecture”, Governing Global Finance, pp. 49–74. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230118010_4. Grabel, Ilene. “Toward a Pluripolar Global Financial Architecture? The Bretton Woods Institutions and the New Landscape of Developmental Finance”, Review of Radical Political Economics, vol. 50, n. 4, pp. 653–659. Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: SAGE Publications Inc., 2018. https://doi.org/10.1177/0486613418761894. Suggested Readings Naciri, Ahmed. “Bretton Woods Institutions Within the International Financial Architecture for Development”, The Governance Structures of the Bretton Woods Financial Institutions, pp. 27–46. Springer Nature, Springer Briefs in Economics, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97906-9_3. (*)Bordo, Michael; Monnet, Eric; Naef, Alain. “The Gold Pool (1961–1968) and the Fall of the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for Central Bank Cooperation”, The Journal of Economic History, vol. 79, n. 4, pp. 1027–1059. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-economic-history/article/gold-pool-19611968-and-the-fall-of-the-bretton-woods-system-lessons-for-central-bank-cooperation/5D875965F46BF6AE6F63B4A6AE409667. Korten, D. “The failure of Bretton Woods” In The Case Against the Global Economy, edited by Jerry Mander (2nd ed., pp. 35–45). Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2001. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315071787.

Week 4

Week 4: IMF Objectives • Analyze the IMF’s governance and policy tools • Assess debates on IMF legitimacy and reform • Explore the IMF's evolving role in debt and climate issues   Discussion Questions • How does the IMF balance creditor and debtor interests? • Are reforms addressing legitimacy concerns? • Should the IMF take on broader development or climate roles? Required Readings Woods, Ngaire; Lombardi, Domenico. “Uneven Patterns of Governance: How Developing Countries Are Represented in the IMF”, Review of International Political Economy, vol. 13, n. 3, pp. 480–515. London, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290600769351. Boughton, James; Brooks, Skylar; Lombardi, Domenico. “IMF Lending Practices and Sovereign Debt Restructuring”, Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), n. 41. Waterloo, Canada: June 2014. https://www.cigionline.org/static/documents/cigi_pb_41.pdf. Lombardi, Domenico. “Asymmetries in the International Monetary System”, Global Financial Crises, edited by Kirton, John, Savona, Paolo and Chiara Oldani. London, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2011. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315584843-22/asymmetries-international-monetary-system-domenico-lombardi. Lombardi, Domenico (2008). “Bringing Balance to the International Monetary Fund Reform Debate”. Washington D.C., USA: Brookings Institution, October 2008. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/bringing-balance-to-the-international-monetary-fund-reform-debate/. Suggested Readings International Monetary Fund. “IMF Support for Low-Income Countries.”, International Monetary Fund. Washington D.C., USA, April 2025. https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/IMF-Support-for-Low-Income-Countries. (*)Momani, Bessma. “Assessing the Utility of, and Measuring Learning from, Canada’s IMF Article IV Consultations”, Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 39, n. 2, pp. 249–269. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006. https://uwaterloo.ca/scholar/sites/ca.scholar/files/bmomani/files/assessing_the_utility_of_and_measuring_learning_from_canadas_imf_article_iv_consultations.pdf. Lombardi, Domenico. “Report to the IMF Managing Director on the Consultations with Global Civil Society on IMF Governance Reform”, New Rules for Global Finance, Washington D.C., USA: Brookings Institution, September 2009. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/imf-governance-reform-and-civil-society/. Lombardi, Domenico; Rustomjee, Cyrus. “The IMF’s Engagement on Natural Disasters and Climate Change Issues Affecting Small Developing States”, International Monetary Fund. Washington D.C., USA: Brookings Institution, 2022. https://ieo.imf.org/-/media/IEO/Files/evaluations/completed/05-17-2022-imf-engagement-with-small-developing-states/sds-bp220105-the-imfs-engagement-on-natural-disasters-and-climate-change-issues-affecting-small-deve.ashx.

Week 5

Week 5: World Bank Group Objectives: • Evaluate the internal governance of the World Bank • Understand stakeholder power and influence • Explore development mandates and project outcomes Discussion Questions: • How is power distributed within the World Bank? • Does corporate governance theory improve accountability? • How do donor interests shape Bank priorities? Required Readings Lombardi, Domenico. “The Governance of the World Bank: Lessons from the Corporate Sector”, The Review of International Organizations, vol. 3, pp. 287–323. Springer Nature, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-008-9036-3. Kaja, Ashwin; Werker, Eric. “Corporate Governance at the World Bank and the Dilemma of Global Governance”, The World Bank Economic Review, vol. 24, n. 2, pp. 171–198. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010. https://academic.oup.com/wber/article/24/2/171/1729197. Clark, Richard; Dolan, Lindsey R. “Pleasing the principal: U.S. influence in World Bank policymaking”, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 64, n. 3, pp. 685–699. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12531. Suggested Readings (*)Kapur, Devesh. “The Changing Anatomy of Governance of The World Bank”, Reinventing the World Bank, edited by Jonathan R. Pincus and Jeffrey A. Winters. Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press, 2002. https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501729492-004. (*)Isaksson, Ann-Sofie; Durevall, Dick. “Aid and institutions: Local Effects of World Bank Aid on Perceived Institutional Quality in Africa”, The Review of International Organizations, vol. 18, pp. 523–551. Springer Nature, 2023. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11558-022-09478-w. Weaver, Catherine. “The World’s Bank and the Bank’s World”, Global Governance, vol. 13, n. 4, pp. 493–512. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800679.

Week 6

Week 6: World Trade Organization Objectives • Understand WTO principles and dispute settlement • Assess critiques of WTO judicial activism • Explore WTO’s relevance in the age of nationalism Discussion Questions • What are the economic justifications for trade rules? • Has the WTO overstepped its mandate? • What reforms could preserve multilateral trade governance? Required Readings Bagwell, Kyle; Staiger, Robert W. “The World Trade Organization: Theory and Practice”, Annual Review of Economics, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 223–256. Palo Alto, CA, USA: Annual Reviews Inc., 2010 https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.economics.102308.124500. Howse, Robert. “The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 27, n. 1, pp. 9–77. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chw011. Baldwin, Richard. “The World Trade Organization and the Future of Multilateralism”, European Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 27, n. 1, pp. 95–116. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.30.1.95. Suggested Readings Narlikar, Amrita. “How is the WTO structured?”, The World Trade Organization: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005. https://books.google.it/books?id=8OgRDAAAQBAJ. (*)Bown, Chad P. “Modern industrial policy and the WTO” (Working Papers 23-15). Washington D.C., USA. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2023. https://www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/2023/modern-industrial-policy-and-wto. McDonald, Brad J.; Ruta, Michele; Van Heuvelen, Elizabeth. “Industrial policy: Trade policy and World Trade Organization Considerations in IMF surveillance”, How To Notes, vol. 2024, n. 2. Washington D.C., USA: International Monetary Fund, 2024. https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400271069.061. Qureshi, Asif H. “The World Trade Organization and the Promotion of Effective Dispute Resolution: In Times of a Trade War”, International Organizations and the Promotion of Effective Dispute Resolution: AIIB Yearbook of International Law 2019, vol. 2, pp. 145–160. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2019. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctvrxk3sj.12.

Week 7

Week 7: G7 and G20 Objectives: • Compare the evolution and roles of G7 and G20 • Explore their impact on global financial regulation • Evaluate criticisms of informality and legitimacy   Discussion Questions • Are the G7 and G20 effective or symbolic? • How inclusive are these formats for emerging powers? • Should the G20 institutionalize further? Required Readings Gallagher, Kevin P. “Good Talk, Little Action: The Limits of the G20”, Ruling Capital: Emerging Markets and the Reregulation of Cross-Border Finance, pp. 155–168. Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1287ds5.11. Lombardi, Domenico; St. Amand, “S. Prioritizing international monetary and financial cooperation for the G20: Views from the T20”, Policy Brief N. 63. Waterloo, Canada: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), 2015. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/193333/pb_no.63_web.pdf. Hajnal, Peter. “Whither the G7 and G20?”, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal vol. 28, n. 2, pp. 127–143. London, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2022.2027797. Suggested Readings Hajnal, Peter I. The G7/G8 System: Evolution, Role and Documentation, pp. 1–41. Abingdon, Oxfordshire, UK: Routledge, 2019. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9780429436406/g7-g8-system-peter-hajnal. Bayne, Nicholas. “The G7 Summit and the Reform of Global Institutions”, Government and Opposition, vol. 30, n. 4, pp.492–509. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/government-and-opposition/article/abs/g7-summit-and-the-reform-of-global-institutions/17AC16CF945D1CE4C03323D8651C8BDB. Lombardi, Domenico. “How the G20 Can Stimulate Innovation”, New Thinking on Innovation. Waterloo, Canada: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2017. http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep17312.22. (*)Maremonti, Francesca. “The G7 and AI Governance: Towards a Deeper and Broader Agenda”. Rome, Italy: Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), November 2024. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep65207. Van de Graaf, Thijs. “Energy Governance in the G7 and G20 after the Ukraine Crisis”, Studia Diplomatica, vol. 68, n. 3, pp. 97–108. Bruxelles, Belgium: Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations, 2017. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26531659.

Week 8

Week 8: FSB Objectives • Analyze the origins and mandate of the FSB • Discuss its role in global regulatory coordination • Evaluate its legitimacy and effectiveness Discussion Questions • Is the FSB sufficiently transparent and inclusive? • How has it shaped post-crisis regulation? • What gaps remain in the global financial safety net? Required Readings Griffith-Jones, Stephany, Eric Helleiner, and Ngaire Woods. “The Financial Stability Board: An Effective Fourth Pillar of Global Economic Governance?” Waterloo, Canada: Centre for International Governance Innovation, June 2010. https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/fsb_special_report_2.pdf. Pagliari, Stefano. “Governing Financial Stability: The Financial Stability Board as the Emerging Pillar in Global Economic Governance”, Handbook of Global Economic Governance”. Abingdon, Oxfordshire, UK: Routledge, 2013. https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/6814/. Moschella, Manuela. “Designing the Financial Stability Board: a theoretical investigation of mandate, discretion, and membership”, Journal of International Relations and Development, vol. 16, pp. 380–405. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016 https://doi.org/10.1057/jird.2012.10. Suggested Readings (*)Lombardi, Domenico. “The Governance of the Financial Stability Board”. Washington D.C., USA: The Brookings Institution, September 2011. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-governance-of-the-financial-stability-board/. “Recommendations on the Financial Stability Board Mandate”, High-Level Panel on the Governance of the Financial Stability Board. Washington D.C., USA: The Brookings Institution, September 2011. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/recommendations-on-the-financial-stability-board-mandate/. (*)Quarles, Randal K. The Financial Stability Board at 10 Years—Looking Back and Looking Ahead. October 2019. https://www.fsb.org/uploads/S031019.pdf. Helleiner, Eric. Global Policy, “What Role for the New Financial Stability Board? The Politics of International Standards after the Crisis”, p.p. 282–290. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00040.x.

Week 9

Week 9: Networks as a form of transnational governance Objectives • Introduce network theory in global governance • Explore informal governance and norm diffusion • Evaluate effectiveness of public-private networks   Discussion Questions • How do networks differ from traditional IOs? • What are their strengths and limitations? • Are they a complement or challenge to state-based governance? Required Readings Roger, Charles; Dauvergne, Peter. “The Rise of Transnational Governance as a Field of Study”, International Studies Review, vol. 18, n. 3, pp. 415–437. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viw001. Kalfagianni, Agni; Partzsch, Lena; Widerberg, Oscar. “Transnational Institutions and Networks”, Architectures of Earth System Governance: Institutional Complexity and Structural Transformation, pp. 75–96. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/architectures-of-earth-system-governance/transnational-institutions-and-networks/440235F12CACD5C8CCCDE9E6A5BC3243. Westerwinter, Oliver. “Transnational governance as strategy? Mapping and explaining the European Union’s participation in transnational public-private governance initiatives”, Journal of European Integration, vol. 44, n. 5, pp. 695–713. London, UK: Routledge, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2022.2086981. Suggested Readings Seabrooke, Leonard; Folke Henriksen, Lasse, eds. “Professional Networks in Transnational Governance”, pp 1–50. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/professional-networks-in-transnational-governance/399BB8337EF686848ABCDC0FA200F6D2#. Cohen, Julie E. “Networks, standards, and transnational governance institutions”, Between truth and power, ch. 7. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. https://academic.oup.com/book/37371/chapter/331349833. Kaiser, Wolfram; Leucht, Brigitte; Gehler, Michael. “Transnational Networks in European Integration Governance: Historical Perspectives on an Elusive Phenomenon”, Transnational Networks in Regional Integration. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230283268_1. Montgomery, Alexander H. In D. Avant & O. Westerwinter (Eds.). “Centrality in transnational governance: How networks of international institutions shape power processes”, New Power Politics: Networks, Governance, and Global Security. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, in press. https://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Projects/SNACent/SNACent.pdf.

Week 10

Week 10: Regional financial arrangements Objectives • Define RFAs and their interaction with the IMF • Assess regionalism in the global financial system • Explore challenges of coherence and fragmentation Discussion Questions • Why do countries pursue RFAs? • Can they offer better crisis response than global institutions? • What risks do overlapping mandates pose? Required Readings Henning, C. Randall. "Regional Financial Arrangements and the International Monetary Fund: Sustaining Coherence in Global Financial Governance". Waterloo, Canada: Centre for International Governance Innovation, January 2020. https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/RFAs%20and%20the%20IMF%20web_1.pdf. Kring, William N.; Grimes, William W. “Leaving the Nest: The Rise of Regional Financial Arrangements and the Future of Global Governance”, Development and Change, vol. 50, n. 1, pp. 72–95. Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12471. Kawai, Masahiro; Lombardi, Domenico. “Financial Regionalism”, Finance & Development, vol. 49, n. 3. Washington D.C., USA: International Monetary Fund, 2012. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/09/kawai.htm. Suggested Readings (*)Foot, Rosemary. “Regions and regionalism”, in Global Governance Futures edited by Weiss, Thomas; Wilkinson, Rorden, 1st ed., part 1, ch. 6. London, UK: Routledge, 2021. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003139836. Eichengreen, Barry. “Regional Financial Arrangements and the International Monetary Fund”. ADBI Working Paper 394, November 2012. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2172113 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2172113. Grimes, William W. “Financial Regionalism after the Global Financial Crisis: Regionalist Impulses and National Strategies”, The Consequences of the Global Financial Crisis: The Rhetoric of Reform and Regulation, pp. 88–108. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199641987.003.0006. Lee, Yaechan; William N. Kring. "Regional Financial Cooperation and Regional Financial Arrangements", Handbook of Regional Cooperation and Integration, pp. 123–142. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2024. https://www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap-oa/book/9781800373747/book-part-9781800373747-13.xml. Medhora, Rohinton P. “Monetary Unions, Regional Financial Arrangements, and Central Bank Swap Lines: Bypasses to the International Monetary Fund?”, AJIL Unbound, vol. 111, pp. 241–313. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27003738. Sohn, Wook; Choi, Jeong-ae. “Global Financial Stability and Regional Financial Arrangements”, Emerging Markets Finance & Trade, vol. 52, n. 10, pp. 2209–11. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2016. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26753056. Sohn, Wook; Chung, Woo Jing. “Regional Financial Arrangements: A Survey of the Literature and Recent Developments”, Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, vol. 52, n. 10, pp. 2238–2252. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2016.1203781.

Week 11

Week 11: EU Institutions with focus on ECB and SSM Objectives • Understand the EU’s financial governance architecture • Assess ECB policies during crises • Explore the creation and limits of the SSM Discussion Questions • How does the EU balance national vs. supranational authority? • Was the ECB successful in preserving the euro? • What lessons does the SSM offer for global banking regulation? Required Readings Moloney, Niamh. “The European Union in International Financial Governance”, The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences, vol. 3, n. 1, pp. 138–52. New York, USA: Russell Sage Foundation, 2017. https://www.rsfjournal.org/content/3/1/138. Lombardi, Domenico; Moschella, Manuela. “The government bond buying programmes of the European Central Bank: an analysis of their policy settings”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 23, n. 6, pp. 851–870. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2015.1069374. Lombardi, Domenico; Moschella, Manuela. “Domestic preferences and European banking supervision: Germany, Italy and the Single Supervisory Mechanism”, West European Politics, vol. 39, n. 3, pp. 462–482. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2016.1143242. Suggested Readings Lombardi, Domenico; Siklos, Pierre, St. Amand, Samantha. “Asset Price Spillovers from Unconventional Monetary Policy: A Global Empirical Perspective”, International Journal of Central Banking. Washington, DC, USA: International Journal of Central Banking, 2017. https://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb19q2a2.pdf. (*)Rehn, Olli. “Reviewing the ECB’s monetary policy strategy in the age of polycrisis”. London, UK: Centre for European Policy Research (CEPR), 2024. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/reviewing-ecbs-monetary-policy-strategy-age-polycrisis. Avgouleas, Emilios; Arner, Douglas W. “The Eurozone Debt Crisis and the European Banking Union: ‘Hard Choices,’ ‘Intolerable Dilemmas,’ and the Question of Sovereignty”, The International Lawyer, vol. 50 n. 1, pp. 29–68. Chicago, USA: American Bar Association, 2017. Accessed via JSTOR. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26415629. Pisani-Ferry, Jean; Sapir, André; Véron, Nicolas; Wolff, Guntram B. “What Kind of European Banking Union?” Bruegel Policy Contribution, 2012. https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/72098/1/718461290.pdf Fiordelisi, Franco; Ferri, Giuseppe; Minenna, Vincenzo; Tamburini, Davide. “The Unintended Consequences of the Launch of the Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe”, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 52, no. 6, pp. 2809–2836. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26590498. Gordon, Jeffrey N.; Ringe Wolf-Georg “Bank Resolution in the European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective on What It Would Take”, Columbia Law Review, vol. 115, no. 5, pp. 1297–1369. New York, USA: Columbia Law Review Association, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43582428.

Week 12

Week 12: The rise of BRICS Objectives • Assess BRICS as a counterweight to the G7 • Analyze internal diversity and external coherence • Evaluate implications for global economic order Discussion Questions • What unites and divides the BRICS bloc? • Can BRICS reshape global governance? • Are they system-challengers or reformers? Required Readings Anand, Prathivadi B.; Comim, Flavio; Fennell, Shailaja. “BRICS and emerging economies: An assessment”, Handbook of BRICS and Emerging Economies. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198827535.003.0001. Cochrane, Logan; Zaidan, Esmet. “Shifting global dynamics: an empirical analysis of BRICS + expansion and its economic, trade, and military implications in the context of the G7”, Cogent Social Sciences, vol. 10, n. 1. Oxfordshire, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2024.2333422. Mooradian, Maximilian G. “The BRICS challenge to the G7 established international order”. Philadelphia, USA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2024. https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/09/the-brics-challenge-to-the-g7-established-international-order/?utm. Suggested Readings (*)Chatterjee, Mihika; Naka, Ikuno. “Twenty Years of BRICS: Political and Economic Transformations Through the Lens of Land”, Oxford Development Studies, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 2–13. Oxford, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2022.2033191. Nach, Marida; Ncwadi, Ronney (2024). “BRICS economic integration: Prospects and challenges”, South African Journal of International Affairs, vol. 31, n. 2, pp. 151–166. Oxford, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2024.2380676. Solomon, Hussein; Solomon, Sanet; Gupta, Bashabi, eds. (2023). “BRICS and climate change: Balancing national interests, national development goals and global environmental sustainability”. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2023. https://luiss.alma.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/openurl?institution=39LLUISSGC_INST&rfr_id=info:sid%2Fsummon&rft_dat=ie%3D51207897660004196,language%3Dit&svc_dat=CTO&u.ignore_date_coverage=true&vid=39LLUISSGC_INST:Services. Radulescu, Irina G.; Panait, Mirela; Voica, Marian C. “BRICS Countries Challenge to the World Economy: New Trends”, Procedia Economics and Finance, vol. 8, pp. 605–613. Amsterdam, NL: Elsevier B.V., 2014. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671(14)00135-X